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Algorithmic copyright enforcement the use of automated filtering
tools to detect infringing content before it appears on the internet has a deep
impact on the freedom of users to upload and share information. Traditional
liability shields for online platforms that host user-generated content
-infringement: the content stemming
from platform users is deemed permissible until the platform provider
receives a sufficiently substantiated notification of infringement. Only then,
the contested content must promptly be removed. The employment of upfront
filtering tools changes this equation substantially. The moment the
algorithmic enforcement system identifies traces of protected source material
in a user upload, the content will be blocked automatically and never become
visible for platform users. Instead of presuming that UGC does not amount
to infringement unless copyright owners take action and provide proof, the
default position of automated filtering systems is that every upload is
suspicious and copyright owners are entitled to ex ante control over the
sharing of information online.
*
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If platform providers voluntarily introduce algorithmic enforcement
measures, this may be seen as a private decision following from the freedom
of companies to run their businesses as they wish.1 If, however, copyright
legislation institutionalizes algorithmic enforcement and imposes a legal
obligation on platform providers to employ automated filtering tools, the law
itself transforms copyright into a censorship and filtering instrument. Instead
of serving as an engine of content creation and dissemination,2 copyright
protection becomes a central basis for content control in the online world.3
Nonetheless, the new EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market
4
follows this path and mandates the
employment of automated filtering tools to ensure that unauthorized
copyrighted content does not populate UGC platforms.5
statutory filtering obligations in EU copyright law (next section 1), the
following analysis will demonstrate that the new EU rules on UGC licensing
and screening will inevitably lead to the adoption of algorithmic enforcement
measures in practice. Without automated content control, UGC platforms
will be unable to escape liability for infringing user uploads (section 2). To
provide a complete picture, however, it is important to also shed light on
counterbalances which may distinguish this new, institutionalized form of
algorithmic enforcement from known content filtering tools that have
evolved as voluntary measures in the private sector. The DSM Directive
1 As to the constitutional recognition of the freedom to conduct a business, see Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 16, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. As to the recognition of this
freedom in the context of platforms for UGC, see Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs,
Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) v. Netlog NV, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62010CJ0360,
¶¶ 45 47, 51.
2 As to this goal of the copyright system, see Harper v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(characterizing copyright as an engine of free expression ). For a detailed analysis of the interplay
between copyright protection and freedom of expression, see P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and
Freedom of Expression in Europe, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 239 (Niva Elkin-Koren
& Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002); SANDRO MACCIACCHINI, URHEBERRECHT UND
MEINUNGSFREIHEIT (2000); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Christophe Geiger &
Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity
Through Freedom of Expression, 45 INT L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316 (2014); Christophe
Geiger, Constitutionalising Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on
Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION LAW 371
(2006); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996);
ALAIN STROWEL ET AL., DROIT D AUTEUR ET LIBERTÉ EXPRESSION (2006)
3 Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1093 (2017).
4 Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and
2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92 [hereinafter DSMD].
5 Id. at art. 17(4)(b).
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underlines the necessity to safeguard user freedoms that support
transformative, creative remixes and mash-ups of pre-existing content. This
feature of the new legislation may offer important incentives to develop
algorithmic tools that go beyond the mere identification of unauthorized
takings from protected works. It has the potential to encourage content
assessment mechanisms that factor the degree of transformative effort and
user creativity into the equation. As a result, more balanced content filtering
tools may emerge in the EU. Implementing the new EU rules in their
domestic legislation,6 EU Member States can pave the way for the described
reverse filtering logic that focuses on UGC elements that may justify user
uploads despite the inclusion of protected third-party content (section 3). In
sum, the new EU legislation not only escalates the use of algorithmic
enforcement measures that already commenced in the private sector years
ago. If rightly implemented, it may also add an important nuance to existing
content identification tools and alleviate the problems arising from reliance
on automated filtering mechanisms (concluding section 4).
I.

VALUE GAP ARGUMENT

UGC is a core element of many internet platforms. With the opportunity
to upload photos, films, music, and texts, formerly passive users become
active contributors to (audio-)visual content portals, wikis, online
marketplaces, discussion and news fora, social networking sites, virtual
worlds, and academic paper repositories.7
myriad of literary and artistic works every day.8 A delicate question arising
from this user-involvement concerns copyright infringement. UGC may
consist of self-created works and public domain material. However, it may
also include unauthorized takings of third-party material that enjoys
copyright protection. As UGC has become a mass phenomenon and a key
factor in the evolution of the modern, participative web,9 this problem raises

6 EU Directives, such as the new DSM Directive, must be embedded in the national legal system
of EU Member States within a given period of time. The deadline for domestic implementation of the
DSM Directive is 7 June 2021. See id. at art. 29(1).
7

See the overview of UGC application that is provided in ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO& DEV., PARTICIPATIVE WEB: USER-CREATED CONTENT (2007), available at
https://www.oecd.org/sti/38393115.pdf [hereinafter OECD].
8 For example, statistics relating to the online platform YouTube report over one billion users
uploading 300 hours of video content every minute. Cf. Youtube for Press, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-GB/yt/about/press/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2019); 37 Mind Blowing
Youtube
Facts,
Figures,
and
Statistics 2019,
MERCHDOPE
(Sept.
29,
2019),
https://www.statisticbrain.com/youtube-statistics/.
9 As to the use and discussion of this term, see OECD, supra note 7.
OPERATION
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complex issues and requires the reconciliation of divergent interests: users,
platform providers, and copyright holders are central stakeholders.10
In the legislative process leading to the adoption of the DSM Directive,
the soUGC. The argument rests on the policy objective to ensure the payment of
adequate remuneration for the online distribution of copyrighted content.11
Traditionally, EU legislation in the field of e-commerce shielded UGC
involved in the posting of content, she only was obliged to take immediate
action and remove content when a rights holder informed her in a sufficiently
precise and substantiated manner about infringing content (notice-andtakedown).12 The safe harbour system was based on the assumption that a
general monitoring obligation would be too heavy a burden for platform
providers. Without the safe harbour, the liability risk would thwart the
creation of internet platforms depending on third-party content and frustrate
the development of e-commerce.13 In its 20
10 As to the debate on user-generated content and the need for the reconciliation of divergent
interests in this area, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Breathing Space for Cloud-Based Business Models:
Exploring the Matrix of Copyright Limitations, Safe Harbours and Injunctions, J. INTELL. PROP. INFO.
TECH. & E-COMM. L. 87, 87 90 (2013); Tom W. Bell, The Specter of Copyism v. Blockheaded Authors:
How User-Generated Content Affects Copyright Policy, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2008); Branwen
Buckley, SueTube: Web 2.0 and Copyright Infringement, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235 (2008); Steven
Hechter, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One Investiture of Ownership,
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863 (2008); S.D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect
User-Generated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, WIDENER L.J. 843 (2010); Mary W.S.
Wong, Transformative User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair
Use?, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075 (2009); Greg Lastowka, User-Generated Content and Virtual
Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 893 (2008); Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content,
UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1459 (2008); Natali Helberger et al., Legal Aspects of User Created Content
(University
of
Amsterdam,
Nov.
14,
2009),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1499333.
11 For an overview of the discussion on UGC prior to the current copyright reform proposals in
the EU, see JEAN-PAUL TRIAILLE ET AL., STUDY ON THE APPLICATION OF DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2013).
12 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 178), art.
14(1) (hereinafter Directive on E-Commerce). Cf. Case C-236/08, Google v. Google France, 2010, par.
114 18; case C-324/09, L Oréal v. eBay, 2011, par. 120 22. For commentary, see CHRISTINA
ANGELOPOULOS, EUROPEAN INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT: A TORT-BASED ANALYSIS
(2016); MARTIN HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
ACCOUNTABLE BUT NOT LIABLE? (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017); STEFAN KULK, INTERNET
INTERMEDIARIES AND COPYRIGHT LAW TOWARDS A FUTURE-PROOF EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK (Univ.
Utrecht 2018); Miquel Peguera, The DMCA Safe Harbour and Their European Counterparts: A
Comparative Analysis of Some Common Problems, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481 (2009); Senftleben, supra
note 10, at 87 103;
13 Directive on E-Commerce, supra note 12, at art. 15(1).
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Commission held the view that the safe harbour for hosting allowed UGC
platforms to generate income without sharing profits with producers of
creative content.14 The value gap argument was born.
copyright legislation the template for the DSM Directive that has now
entered into force sought to render the liability shield inapplicable when it
came to copyrighted works.15 The underlying strategy was simple: deprived
of the safe harbour for hosting and exposed to direct liability for infringing
user uploads, platform providers would have to embark on UGC licensing
and filtering. With the erosion of the legal certainty resulting from the
traditional liability privilege, a platform provider seeking to avoid liability
risks would enter into agreements with copyright owners. The initial
Commission proposal already contemplated that these agreements with right
holders would bring filtering obligations in their wake. The Commission
16

Algorithmic enforcement measures, thus, played a central role in the EU
copyright reform agenda from the outset. The value gap argument and the
intention to generate new revenue streams for copyright owners served as a
vehicle to present content filtering obligations as a necessary evil that had to
be accepted.
II. NEW LICENSING AND FILTERING OBLIGATIONS
Despite the early focus on algorithmic enforcement, an unequivocal
filtering obligation is sought in vain in the legislative text that evolved from
14 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Modern, More European
Copyright Framework, at 9 10, COM (2015) 266 final (Dec. 9, 2015)
15 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Copyright in the Digital Single Market, art. 13, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter DSM
Directive Proposal]. Prior to this formal proposal of copyright legislation seeking to neutralize the safe
harbour for hosting, the French High Council for Literary and Artistic Property had published a research
paper prepared by Professor Pierre Sirinelli, Josée-Anne Benazeraf, and Alexandra Bensamoun on 3
November 2015. The researchers had been asked to propose changes to current EU legislation enabling
the effective enforcement of copyright and related rights in the digital environment, particularly on
platforms which disseminate protected content. They arrived at the conclusion that a provision should be
added to current EU copyright legislation making it clear that information society service providers that
give access to the public to copyright works and/or subject-matter, including through the use of automated
tools, do not benefit from the limitation set out [in the safe harbour for hosting of the E-Commerce
Directive 2000/31/EC]. See HIGH COUNCIL FOR LITERARY & ARTISTIC PROP. OF THE FRENCH MINISTRY
OF CULTURE & COMM., MISSION TO LINK DIRECTIVES 2000/31 AND 2001/29 REPORT AND PROPOSALS
11 (2015)
16 DSM Directive Proposal, supra note 15, at art. 13(1).
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the EU copyright reform. Instead of openly embracing algorithmic copyright
enforcement, the final provision Article 17 DSMD establishes a complex
matrix of obligations to license and filter UGC. Providers of UGC platforms
legislation)17 can either obtain an authorization from copyright holders to
offer UGC on their platforms (license approach, following section II.A) or
take measures to prevent the availability of infringing content from the outset
(filtering approach, following section II.B).18 A closer look at these ways out
of the dilemma reveals that both options will inevitably lead to the application
of algorithmic enforcement measures and raise policy dilemmas in practice.
A.

Indirect Algorithmic Enforcement Obligations

At the core of licensing obligations under the new EU copyright
legislation lies the grant of a specific, exclusive right in Article 17(1) DSMD
that leads to strict, primary liability of UGC platform providers for infringing
content that is uploaded by users:
Member States shall provide that an online content sharing
service provider performs an act of communication to the
public or an act of making available to the public when it
gives the public access to copyright protected works or other
protected subject matter uploaded by its users.19

authorization of the copyright owner.20 By clarifying that the activities of
UGC platform providers amount to communication to the public or making
available to the public, the new legislation collapses the traditional distinction
between primary liability of users who upload infringing content, and
secondary liability of online platforms which encourage or contribute to
infringing activities. Under Article 17(1) DSMD, it no longer matters
whether the provider of a UGC platform had knowledge of infringement,
encouraged infringing uploads or failed to promptly remove infringing
content after receiving a notification. Instead, the platform provider is
directly and primarily liable for infringing content that arrives at the
17 As to the scope of the concept of online content-sharing services provider, see DSMD, supra
note 4, at art. 2(6).
18 Id. at art. 17(1).
19 Id.
20 Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 3,
annex, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1, 10.
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platform.21 In this way, EU legislation incentivizes rights clearance
initiatives. To reduce the liability risk, the platform provider will have to
obtain a license.22 To fully understand the scope and reach of this licensing
obligation, it is necessary to consider the instructions given in Article 17(2)
DSMD:
Member States shall provide that when an authorisation has
been obtained, including via a licensing agreement, by an
online content sharing service provider, this authorisation
shall also cover acts carried out by users of the services
falling within Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC when they
are not acting on a commercial basis or their activity does
not generate significant revenues.
An online platform seeking to obtain a license for UGC is thus
confronted with an enormous licensing task. Even though it is unforeseeable
which content users will upload, the license should ideally encompass the
whole spectrum of potential posts. This broad licensing obligation seems
beneficial to users. In line with Article 17(2) DSMD, a UGC license can be
expected to encompass their activities and minimize their exposure to
infringement claims. Given the obligation to cover all kinds of noncommercial user uploads, however, the provision creates a rights clearance
task which platform providers can hardly ever accomplish.23
Traditionally, collecting societies have a strong position in the EU. As
they have far-reaching mandates to administer the rights of copyright owners,
they seem natural partners in the development of umbrella licensing solutions
with the scope envisaged in Article 17(2) DSMD. However, they would have
to offer an all-embracing licensing deal covering not only protected content
of their members but also content of non-members. Otherwise, the licensing
exercise makes little sense. It would fail to cover all types of user uploads.
Considering experiences with licensing packages offered by collecting
societies in the past, it seems safe to assume that an umbrella solution with
these proportions is currently unavailable in many EU Member States. It
remains to be seen whether the implementation of the DSM Directive,

21 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(3), confirms this result by clarifying that the traditional liability
shield for providers of UGC hosting services shall not apply to the situations covered by this Article.
22 Id. at art. 17(4)(a).
23 Cf. Martin R.F. Senftleben, Content Censorship and Council Carelessness Why the
Parliament Must Safeguard the Open, Participative Web 2.0, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- &
INFORMATIERECHT 139, 141 (2018).
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including harmonized rules on extended collective licensing,24 paves the way
for broader and more flexible licensing solutions. Even if a platform finds a
collecting society willing to enter into a UGC agreement with the umbrella
effect contemplated in Article 17(2), however, a core problem of licenses for
Europe remains: the collecting society landscape is highly fragmented. The
UGC deal available in one Member State may remain limited to the territory
of that Member State. Pan-European licenses are the exception, not the rule.
If a collecting society offers Pan-European licenses for digital use, these
licenses will be confined to the specific repertoire, in respect of which the
collecting society has a cross-border entitlement.25
Problems also arise in the field of initiatives to obtain licenses directly
from copyright holders. In the music industry, the willingness to grant
licenses covering a broad spectrum of musical works may be relatively high.
Existing services, such as Spotify, demonstrate that far-reaching licenses,
encompassing recent music releases, are available. In the film industry,
however, the situation is markedly different. The exploitation of film
productions traditionally takes place in several stages. The release in cinemas
is the first step, followed by pay TV exploitation, linear broadcasting on
regular TV channels, and DVD sales and the distribution via general videoon-demand services. Film studios are unlikely to sacrifice this profitable
exploitation cascade by permitting users to share audio-visual material from
day one of the release in movie theatres. This would enable UGC platforms
to enter into direct competition with the primary exploitation undertaken by
the film studio itself. If, despite these concerns, there is willingness to
conclude UGC licensing agreements, film studios will only accept
agreements with limited use permissions that do not jeopardize their own
opportunities to exploit the film in several stages and uphold the traditional
exploitation cascade.

24 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 12. As to the discussion of extended licensing solutions in the area
of orphan works, see Stef van Gompel, Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address
the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, 38 INT L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 669 (2007).
25 For a detailed analysis of current EU rights clearance challenges in the digital environment, see
SEBASTIAN FELIX SCHWEMER, LICENSING AND ACCESS TO CONTENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
REGULATION BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND COMPETITION LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019). As to
previous cases triggered by the rights clearance infrastructure in the EU, see Summary of Commission
Decision 2008/C 323/08 of 16 July 2008 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and
Art. 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C-2/38.698 CISAC), 2008 O.J. (C 323) 1, 12; Commission
Recommendation 2005/737 of 18 May 2005 on Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and
Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services (2005/737/EC), 2005 O.J. (L 276) 1, 54. Cf. Kamiel
Koelman, Op naar de Euro-Buma(s): de Aanbeveling van de Europese Commissie over
grensoverschrijdend collectief rechtenbeheer, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS-, MEDIA- EN
INFORMATIERECHT, 191 96 (2005).
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UGC licensing under Article 17(1) and (2) DSMD is thus unlikely to
preserve the current participative web 2.0. As long as licensing deals cover
only a limited spectrum of repertoire and include several restrictions on the
s will
no longer enjoy the freedom of uploading remixes and mash-ups of all kinds
of pre-existing material in the EU. Instead, they will only be able to upload
content that falls within the scope of the licensing agreement, which the UGC
platform managed to conclude with copyright holders and collecting
societies. As a corollary, UGC platforms will no longer offer the content
diversity that is currently available. In the absence of umbrella licenses
covering all kinds of UGC (and all EU Member States), the platforms will
have to limit the spectrum of content and the extent of use (in terms of scope
and reach of takings from protected works) to licensed material, permitted
use modalities, and covered territories.
Given these restrictions, the licensing approach, inevitably, leads to the
introduction of filtering tools. As copyright holders and collecting societies
are unlikely to offer all-embracing umbrella licenses, UGC platforms are
likely to rely on algorithmic tools to ensure that content uploads do not
overstep the limits of the use permissions they managed to obtain. Hence,
licenses for UGC are a starting point for algorithmic enforcement measures.
Upload filtering will be necessary to police the borders of the use permissions
received from copyright owners and collecting societies. The licensing
approach will lead to the use of filtering tools to ensure the congruence of
user uploads with the use permissions given by copyright holders and
collecting societies.
In accordance with the limits of licensing deals which UGC platforms
manage to conclude, algorithmic enforcement measures will curtail the
freedom of users to participate actively in the creation of online content. If a
user-generated remix is not in line with the repertoire and use restrictions
following from licensing deals, it will not pass the content filter. As a
corollary, the licensing approach will curtail the possibility of users to learn
of views and expressions of others. UGC portals relying on licensing deals
will find it difficult to provide access to the wide variety of content that is
uploaded by users with diverse social, cultural, and ethnical backgrounds.
Platform providers following the licensing approach are likely to focus on
mainstream works and the biggest language groups to maximize the return
on investment in rights clearance. Hence, the risk of UGC impoverishment
must not be underestimated. The focus on mainstream works and big
language groups entails the risk of neglecting minority groups, minority
views, and niche audiences. In light of the cultural diversity in and across EU
Member States, this problem is serious.
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Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that big players in the UGC platform
arena with various establishments across the EU will have less difficulty
to obtain licenses in different Member States with different languages and
different rules on license agreements. The licensing option may thus give big
players a competitive advantage that leads to further market concentration.
The corrosive effect of licensing obligations in the field of UGC is thus
twofold. It concerns the diversity of content and, at the same time, the
spectrum of service providers. On balance, the licensing scenario and
accompanying algorithmic enforcement measures are problematic from the
perspective of both public and private interests.
B.

Direct Algorithmic Enforcement Obligations

As an alternative, Article 17(4) DSMD offers UGC platforms the
prospect of a reduction of the liability risk in exchange for content filtering.
If a UGC platform despite best efforts26 has not received a license, it can
avoid liability for unauthorized acts of communication to the public or
making available to the public when it manages to demonstrate that it:
[M]ade, in accordance with high industry standards of
professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the
unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for
which the rightholders have provided the service providers
with the relevant and necessary information.27
Although the provision contains neutral terms to describe this
of specific works and ot
automated filtering tools seems inescapable to ensure that unauthorized
protected content does not populate UGC platforms. This filtering approach
reflects the aforementioned remarkable transformation of copyright law into
a censorship instrument. Inevitably, it raises the question whether the
obligation to use filtering tools violates higher ranking, constitutional norms.
Does EU copyright legislation encroach upon fundamental freedoms when
institutionalizing algorithmic enforcement?
EU primary law, in particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (CFR), sets direct limits to inroads into user freedoms and
measures which EU legislators may impose on information society service
providers, including providers of UGC platforms. The Court of Justice of the

26
27

DSMD, supra note 4, at art.17(4)(a).
Id. at art. 17(4)(b).
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EU (CJEU) has stated explicitly that in transposing EU directives and
implementing transposing measures,
Member States must . . . take care to rely on an interpretation
of the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck
between the various fundamental rights protected by the
Community legal order.28
Interestingly, the application of filtering technology to a social media
platform hosting UGC already occupied center stage in Sabam/Netlog. The
could be filled with photos, texts, video clips, etc.29 Claiming that users make
unauthorized use of music and films belonging to its repertoire, the collecting
society Sabam sought to obtain an injunction obliging Netlog to install a
s expense, this system would have applied
indiscriminately to all users for an unlimited period and would have been
capable of identifying electronic files containing music and films from the
Sabam repertoire. In the case of a match, the system would have prevented
relevant files from being made available to the public.30 Given these
underlying facts, the Sabam/Netlog case offered the CJEU the chance to
provide guidance on a filtering system that may become a standard measure
under Article 17(4)(b) of the DSMD.
However, the CJEU did not arrive at the conclusion that such a filtering
system could be deemed permissible. Instead, the Court saw a serious
infringement of fundamental rights. It took as a starting point the explicit
recognition of intellectual property as a fundamental right in Article 17(2) of
the CFR. At the same time, the Court recognized that intellectual property
must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental rights and
freedoms.31 Weighing the right to intellectual property asserted by Sabam
Article 16 of the CFR, the Court observed that the filtering system would
interests of copyright holders, would have no limitation in time, would be
directed at all future infringements, and would be intended to protect not only

28 Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU,
2008 E.C.R. I-00271, ¶ 68.
29 Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam)
v. Netlog NV, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62010CJ0360, ¶¶ 16 18 (Feb. 16, 2012).
30
31

Id. ¶¶ 26, 36 37.
Id. ¶¶ 41 44.
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existing but also future works.32 Against this background, the CJEU
concluded that the filtering system would encroach
to conduct a business:
Accordingly, such an injunction would result in a serious
infringement of the freedom of the hosting service provider
to conduct its business since it would require that hosting
service provider to install a complicated, costly, permanent
computer system at its own expense, which would also be
contrary to the conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of
Directive 2004/48, which requires that measures to ensure
the respect of intellectual property rights should not be
unnecessarily complicated or costly (see, by analogy, Scarlet
Extended, paragraph 48).33
The CJEU also found that the filtering system would violate the
their personal data and their freedom to receive or impart information, as
safeguarded by Articles 8 and 11 of the CFR respectively.34 The Court
recalled that the use of protected material in online communications may be
lawful under statutory limitations of copyright in the Member States, and that
some works may have already entered the public domain or been made
available for free by the authors concerned.35 Given this corrosive effect on
fundamental rights, the Court concluded:
Consequently, it must be held that, in adopting the injunction
requiring the hosting service provider to install the contested
filtering system, the national court concerned would not be
respecting the requirement that a fair balance be struck
between the right to intellectual property, on the one hand,
and the freedom to conduct business, the right to protection
of personal data and the freedom to receive or impart
information, on the other (see, by analogy, Scarlet Extended,
paragraph 53).36
In the light of this case law, it can hardly be concluded that the filtering
obligation that can be deduced from Article 17(4)(b) of the DSMD is
unproblematic. By contrast, it is likely to encroach upon the fundamental
rights and freedoms guaranteed under Articles 8, 11, and 16 of the CFR.
32

Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶¶ 46 47.
34 Id. ¶¶ 48 50.
33

35
36

Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 51.
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Admittedly, Sabam/Netlog concerned a general monitoring obligation
targeting all types of content which users may upload. The drafters of Article
17(4)(b) of the DSMD seem to make an attempt to distinguish the
institutionalization of algorithmic enforcement from this general monitoring
obligation and escape the verdict of an infringement of fundamental rights by
for which the rightholders have provided the service providers with the
37
The intention to obviate the
impression of a general monitoring obligation also seems to lie at the core of
Article 17(8) of the DSMD. This provision declares that UGC licensing and
38

However, the success of this strategy is doubtful. It would come as a
surprise if the content industry made a specific selection of works when
sending copyright information to UGC platform providers in line with Article
17(4)(b) of the DSMD. It seems more realistic that platform providers will
receive long lists of all works which copyright holders have in their
39
included
in right holder notifications, the conclusion may be inescapable that Article
17(4)(b) of the DSMD culminates in a filtering obligation that corresponds
with the filtering measures which the CJEU prohibited in Sabam/Netlog.
Given this risk, it is surprising that Article 17 of the DSMD leaves the
question unanswered in which way the legislator seeks to prevent excessive
content filtering. Article 17(4)(b) of the DSMD refers to
standards of professional diligence.
diligent cooperation, however, it is to be considered that decisions following
from industry roundtables will be aligned with efficiency considerations.
Industry decisions can be expected to be rational in the sense that they seek
to achieve content filtering at minimal costs.
Hence, there is no guarantee that industry cooperation in the field of
UGC will lead to the adoption of the most sophisticated filtering systems with
the highest potential to avoid unjustified content removals of mash-ups and
remixes. A test of proportionality is unlikely to occupy center stage unless
the least intrusive measure also constitutes the least costly measure. While
Article 17(5) of the DSMD provides guidelines for the assessment of the
the
type of works or other

37

DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(4)(b).

38

Id. at art. 17(8).
Id. at art. 17(4)(b).

39
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cost for service providers. 40 Cost and efficiency factors are decisive. It is
conceivable that these factors encourage the adoption of cheap and
unsophisticated filtering tools that lead to excessive content blocking. A
UGC platform seeking to minimize the risk of liability is likely to succumb
to the temptation of overblocking.41 Filtering more than necessary is less
risky than filtering only clear-cut cases of infringement. After all, the
primary, direct liability for infringing user uploads, which follows from
Article 17(1) of the DSMD, is hanging above the head of UGC platform
providers like the sword of Damocles. In addition, incentives or obligations
to prevent overblocking are sought in vain in Article 17 of the DSMD. As the
indirect algorithmic enforcement obligations that will arise from the
unavailability of umbrella licenses for UGC, the direct legal obligation of
content filtering (that arises in the absence of licensing deals) raises serious
concerns about an encroachment upon public and private interests.
III. SAFEGUARDS FOR TRANSFORMATIVE USE
However, the new EU legislation is not only about licensing and
filtering, but also about measures to preserve breathing space for
transformative forms of UGC.42 Article 17(7) of the DSMD underlines the
need to safeguard copyright limitations for creative remix activities, in
43

As these use privileges enhance freedom
of expression and information, they are important counterbalances (following
section III.A).44 If the exemption of UGC is based on these use privileges and

40

Id. at art. 17(5).
Cf. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 490 91(2016). For empirical studies pointing towards overblocking, see
Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, Behind the Scenes of Online Copyright Enforcement: Empirical
Evidence on Notice & Takedown, 50 CONN. L. REV. 339, 377 (2018) ( Overall, the N&TD regime has
become fertile ground for illegitimate censorship and removal of potentially legitimate materials. );
Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, 2 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2755628, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755628 ( About
30% of takedown requests were potentially problematic. In one in twenty-five cases, targeted content did
not match the identified infringed work, suggesting that 4.5 million requests in the entire six-month data
set were fundamentally flawed. Another 19% of the requests raised questions about whether they had
sufficiently identified the allegedly infringed work or the allegedly infringing material. ).
42 Martin Senftleben, Bermuda Triangle Licensing, Filtering and Privileging User-Generated
Content Under the New Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
480, 480 90 (2019).
43 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(7)(a) (b).
44 P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities,
29 30 (University of Amsterdam 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959554. For a discussion
41
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combined with the payment of equitable remuneration, Article 17(7) of the
DSMD can even generate new revenue streams that support the general
policy objective of the new EU legislation to close the value gap (section
III.B). To implement this new limitation infrastructure in their national laws,
understood to encompass content medleys of users which go beyond the
-ended
UGC (section III.C). Even though platform providers will still have to
distinguish between permissible pastiche and prohibited piracy, the
introduction of new use privileges for UGC is an important step in the right
direction because it is a gateway to the development of algorithmic tools that
follow a different filtering logic. Instead of focusing on traces of protected
third-party content that may render user uploads impermissible, a filtering
system looking for quotations, parodies, and pastiches focuses on creative
user input that may justify the unauthorized upload (section III.D). Until
algorithmic enforcement tools with this reverse filtering logic become widely
available, complaint and redress mechanisms will play a crucial role for
creative users in the EU (section III.E).
A.

Impact of Freedom of Expression

Article 17(7) of the DSMD leaves little doubt that the use of algorithmic
enforcement measures must not submerge areas of freedom for the creation
and dissemination of transformative amateur productions that are uploaded
to UGC platforms:
The cooperation between online content-sharing service
providers and rightholders shall not result in the prevention
of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded
by users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights,
including where such works or other subject matter are
covered by an exception or limitation.
Member States shall ensure that users in each Member State
are able to rely on any of the following existing exceptions
or limitations when uploading and making available content
generated by users on online content-sharing services:
(a) quotation, criticism, review;

of new UGC use privileges under the umbrella of EU copyright law, see TRIAILLE ET AL., supra note 11,
at 522 27, 531 34.
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(b) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche.45
The formulation
that users . .
(k) of the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC (ISD),46 these use
privileges were only listed as limitation prototypes which EU Member States
are free to introduce (or maintain) at the national level. The adoption of a
quotation right47 and an exemption of caricature, parody, or pastiche48
remained optional. Article 17(7) of the DSMD, however, transforms these
use privileges into mandatory breathing space for transformative UGC at
least in the specific context of algorithmic enforcement measures taken by
platform providers.49 This metamorphosis makes copyright limitations in this
automated filtering tools.
Traditionally, copyright limitations have been interpreted restrictively
in the EU.50 In line with the traditional approach in EU Member States, the
CJEU adhered to the dogma of strict interpretation in Infopaq.51 The
effective
arguments against excessive UGC filtering. In Painer, the CJEU underlined
the need for an interpretation of the quotation right following from Article
5(3)(d) of the ISD that enables its effectiveness and safeguards its purpose.52
The Court clari
fair balance between the right of freedom of expression of users of a work or
other protected subject-matter and the reproduction right conferred on
45
46

DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(7).
Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(3)(d), (k), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EC).

47

Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(3)(d), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EC).
Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(3)(k), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EC).
49 Cf. J. Quintais, et al., Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 of the Copyright
in the Digital Single Market Directive: Recommendations From European Academics 2 (University of
Amsterdam
Institute
for
Information
Law,
Nov.
21,
2019),
available
at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3484968.
48

50 As to the underlying differences in the theoretical underpinning and practical configuration of
copyright protection in common law and civil law jurisdictions, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Bridging the
Differences Between Copyright s Legal Traditions the Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S. 521, 522 25 (2010). But see J.C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary
Property in Revolutionary France and America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, 131, 133 (B. Sherman &
A. Strowel eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994), who points out that the antagonism between copyright s
legal traditions must not be overestimated from a historical perspective.
51
52

Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I 06569.
Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I 12533.
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53

In its further decision in Deckmyn, the CJEU followed the same
path with regard to the parody exemption in Article 5(3)(k) of the ISD. As in
Painer, the Court bypassed the dogma of strict interpretation and underlined
the need to ensure the effectiveness of the parody exemption54 as a means to
balance copyright protection against freedom of expression.55

is capable of providing reliable breathing space for UGC evolving from the
transformative use of protected pre-existing works. As the decisions of the
CJEU demonstrate, the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression
plays a crucial role in this context.56 Relying on Article 11 of the CFR and
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the CJEU
interpreted the quotation right and the parody exemption less strictly than
limitations without a comparably strong freedom of speech underpinning.57
In both the Painer and the Deckmyn decision, the Court emphasized the need
authors on the one hand, and the rights of users of protected subject-matter
58
The Court thus referred to quotations and parodies as user
As long as UGC is the result of creative efforts that add value to
underlying source material,59 user-generated remixes, and mash-ups of thirdparty content can be qualified as a specific form of transformative use falling
under Article 11 of the CFR and Article 10 of the ECHR. Arguably, the
also relevant to other categories of creative UGC: as a copyright rule that
seeks to strike a balance between copyright protection and freedom of
expression, an exemption of UGC creation and dissemination must not be
interpreted strictly.
53

Id.
Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2132 (Sept. 3, 2014).
55 Id.
56 For a discussion of the status quo reached in balancing copyright protection against freedom of
expression, see
Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Freedom of Expression as an External Limitation to Copyright
Law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU Shows the Way, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 131,
133 36 (2019).
57 As to the influence of freedom of speech guarantees on copyright law in the EU, see
MACCIACCHINI, supra note 2; Benkler, supra note 2 Geiger, supra note 2; Geiger & Izyumenko, supra
note 2; Hugenholtz, supra note 2; Netanel, supra note 2; Strowel, supra note 2.
58 Case C-145/10, Painer v. VerlagsGmbh, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533, ¶ 132; Case C-201/13, Deckmyn
v. Vandersteen, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2132 (Sept. 3, 2014), ¶ 26; see also Case C-476/17,
Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CA0476, ¶¶ 32, 37, 59 (July 29, 2019).
59 OECD, supra note 7, at 8.
54
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Payment of Equitable Remuneration

To further enhance the effectiveness of the copyright limitations listed
in Article 17(7) of the DSMD, it is advisable to consider the policy dimension
of the filtering debate in the EU. As explained above, the new algorithmic
enforcement obligations flow from the desire to ensure the payment of
adequate remuneration for the use of copyrighted source material in the
context of UGC creation and dissemination. For courts hearing a case about
excessive content filtering, this policy objective may be a reason to take a
cautious approach to copyright limitations. Judges may feel that broad UGC
privileges deprive copyright owners of the opportunity to prohibit UGC
dissemination unless they are adequately paid for authorizing the use.
With regard to this concern about the loss of a new source of income,
however, it is to be considered that copyright limitations need not be equated
with use free of charge in an EU context. While the US fair use doctrine does
not provide for the payment of equitable remuneration,60 the inclusion of this
feature is not incompatible in the EU. The payment of fair compensation
constitutes an important aspect of the limitation system in the Information
Society Directive and the copyright acts of many EU Member States.61 It is
understood to enhance the breathing space for unauthorized use. When the
permission of a specific form of unauthorized use seems desirable even
though it has a deep impact on the position of the right owner, the payment
of equitable remuneration constitutes an additional balancing tool that can be
used to minimize the corrosive effect of the use privilege. The offer of
remuneration reduces the harm flowing from a broad copyright limitation to
an acceptable, reasonable level. The far-reaching exemption of digital private
copying in the EU reflects the remarkable potential of lumpsum remuneration
payments to create additional breathing space for use privileges.62 A
60

(1990).
61

In certain cases of exceptions or limitations, rightholders should receive fair compensation to
compensate them adequately for the use made of their protected works or other subject-matter. When
determining the form, detailed arrangements, and possible level of such fair compensation, account
should be taken of the particular circumstances of each case. When evaluating these circumstances,
a valuable criterion would be the possible harm to the rightholders resulting from the act in question.
Directive 2001/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation
of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 35.
62 A remuneration-based solution of the private copying dilemma has been chosen in Article
5(2)(a) and (b) ISD. As to the problem of finding appropriate parameters for determining the right amount
of remuneration, see Case C-467/08, Editores v. Padawan, 2010 E.C.R. I-10055, ¶ 49; Case C-457/11 to
C-460/11, VG Wort v. KYOCERA Document Solutions Deutschland, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS
62011CA0457 ¶¶ 76 77 (June 27, 2013); Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int l Sales Inc. v. Austro-Mechana
Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte Gesellschaft mbH, 2013 EUR-
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remuneration mechanism can also substantially enhance the room to
maneuver in the area of UGC. As it generates a revenue stream, it becomes
possible to provide for a broad UGC privilege while, at the same time,
ensuring the payment of remuneration and supporting the policy objective of
the new EU legislation to close the value gap. In a nutshell, a remunerated
copyright limitation for UGC creation and dissemination only deprives
copyright owners of their right to categorically prohibit use. It need not
deprive copyright owners of a new source of income.
The nature of UGC offers useful starting points for the introduction of
remuneration systems without damaging the long-standing rule that
quotations and parodies are free of charge.63 The degree of transformative
effort in UGC cases is not always comparable with the degree of
transformation in quotation and parody scenarios. Instead of modifying or
making a critical comment on protected third-party material, a user-generated
remix or mash-up may simply combine preown creation. This remix or mash-up character of UGC may preclude the
successful invocation of the right of quotation. In Pelham, the CJEU held that
an essential characteristic of a quotation was
the use, by a user other than the copyright holder, of a work
or, more generally, of an extract from a work for the
purposes of illustrating an assertion, of defending an opinion
or of allowing an intellectual comparison between that work
and the assertions of that user, since the user of a protected
work wishing to rely on the quotation exception must
therefore have the intention of
that work . . . .64
Lex CELEX LEXIS 62011CA0521 ¶ 24 (July 11, 2013); Case C-435/12, Aci Adam BV v. Stichting de
Thuiskopie, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CA0435 ¶ 52 (Apr. 10, 2014); Case C-463/12,
Båndkopi v. Danmark, 2015 E.C.R. 144, ¶ 23 (Mar. 5, 2015).
63 Article 5(3)(d) and (k) ISD do not provide for the payment of remuneration. This corresponds
with the legal traditions in EU Member States. Traditionally, the strong freedom of expression
underpinning of the right of quotation and the exemption of parody the high degree of creative effort
added by the user led to the permission of quotations and parodies without any financial compensation.
Cf. TRIAILLE ET AL., supra note 11, at 465 72, 476 81; Reto M. Hilty & Martin R.F. Senftleben,
Rückschnitt durch Differenzierung? Wege zur Reduktion dysfunktionaler Effekte des Urheberrechts auf
Kreativ- und Angebotsmärkte, in VOM MAGNETTONBAND ZU SOCIAL MEDIA FESTSCHRIFT 50 JAHRE
URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ (URHG) 317, 325 28 (Thomas Dreier & Reto Hilty eds., 2015); Martin R.F.
Senftleben, Quotations, Parody and Fair Use, in 1912 2012: A CENTURY OF DUTCH COPYRIGHT LAW
345, 351 54 (Bernt Hugenholtz et al. eds., 2012).
64 Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, 2019 Eur-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62017CA0476, ¶ 71
(July 29, 2019). As to the background of this decision, see L. Bently et al., Sound Sampling, a Permitted
Use Under EU Copyright Law? Opinion of the European Copyright Society in Relation to the Pending
Reference Before the CJEU in Case C-476/17, Pelham GmbH v. Hütter, 50 INT L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 467, 486 87 (2019).
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As Lionel Bently and Tanya Aplin have shown, this approach to the
right of quotation may be incompatible with the international quotation
standard laid down in Article 10(1) of the Berne Convention where limiting
preconditions for the invocation of the use privilege, such as shortness, nonmodification, incorporation, referencing back or distinctness, are sought in
vain. Bently and Aplin conclude that the ordinary meaning, which the term
has across the entire spectrum of work categories and artistic practices,
65
should serve as a basis for
This approach does not support a restrictive dialogue requirement that may
be deduced from the CJEU statement in Pelham.
relaxed its Pelham conditions, however, UGC may still include a protected
-existing content is simply added to enrich
UGC (background music for a funny animal video can serve as an example),
it will remain difficult to qualify the use as a permissible quotation. This
result, however, can serve as a starting point for the development of a
remunerated UGC privilege that goes beyond the right of quotation and the
exemption of parody. The lower degree of creative input in the animal video
example does not pose an insuperable obstacle. By contrast, it offers a
starting point for efforts to establish a new revenue stream. The underlying
logic is simple: the payment of equitable remuneration counterbalances the
lower degree of creative investment in the transformation of source material.
To the extent that the harm flowing from a broad UGC use privilege seems
unreasonable because of limited creative input, the payment of equitable
remuneration reduces this unreasonable prejudice to a permissible,
reasonable level.66 Taking the EU regulation of private copying as a reference
point,67 a corresponding UGC exemption in EU copyright law could be
65 Tanya Aplin & Lionel Bently, Displacing the Dominance of the Three-Step Test: The Role of
Global, Mandatory Fair Use, in COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS IN
COPYRIGHT LAW (Wee Loon Ng et al. eds., forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119056;
Lionel Bently & Tanya Aplin, Whatever Became of Global Mandatory Fair Use? A Case Study in
Dysfunctional Pluralism, in IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PLURALISM FUNCTIONAL? (Susy Frankel ed.,
forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119041.
66 Cf. the overarching rule for the regulation of copyright limitations in the EU that is laid down
in Article 5(5) of the ISD and modelled on the international three-step tests in Article 9(2) BC, Article 13
TRIPS and Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. For a more detailed discussion of this solution in
the light of the three-step test, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, User-Generated Content Towards a New Use
Privilege in EU Copyright Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON IP AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES (T. Aplin
ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, forthcoming), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325017; TRIAILLE
ET AL., supra note 11, at 531 34. See also the discussion of three-step test compliance of a UGC exemption
by Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 175,
195 96 (2014).
67 As to the conceptual contours of the private copying levy system in the EU, see Case C-463/12,
Båndkopi v. Danmark, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CA0463 ¶ 23 (Mar. 5, 2015); Case C-
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configured as follows: users could remain free to create and upload content
mash-ups and remixes even if they do not fall within the scope of the right of
quotation and the exemption of parody. Providers of UGC platforms,
however, would be obliged to pay equitable remuneration for the
dissemination of UGC that falls within the scope of the new, broadened UGC
privilege.68
In comparison with the described problems arising from licensing and
filtering obligations, this reliance on a remunerated UGC privilege has the
advantage of creating a continuous revenue stream for authors and
performers. While licensing and filtering agreements between copyright
owners and platform providers may predominantly benefit the content
industry, the repartitioning scheme of collecting societies receiving UGC
levy payments could ensure that authors and performers obtain a substantial
part of the UGC remuneration, even if they have transferred their copyright
and neighboring rights to exploiters of their works and performances.69 The
value gap problem could thus be solved in a way that benefits not only the
creative industry but also individual creators of content.
parody and quotation cases and other forms of UGC. Insofar as UGC falls
435/12, Aci Adam BV v. Stichting de Thuiskopie, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CA0435 ¶ 52
(Apr. 10, 2014); Case C-521/11, Amazon.com Int l Sales Inc. v. Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur
Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte Gesellschaft mbH, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 62011CA0521 ¶ 24 (July 11, 2013); Case C-457/11 to C-460/11, VG Wort v. KYOCERA
Document Solutions Deutschland, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62011CA0457 ¶ 76 77 (June 27,
2013); Case C-467/08, Padawan SL v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 62008CA0467 ¶ 49 (Oct. 21, 2010). As to the use of private copying regimes as a reference point
for generating a robust revenue stream, see Christophe Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity and
Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 413, 450 51 (2018).
68 Cf. Matthias Leistner, Copyright Law on the Internet in Need of Reform: Hyperlinks, Online
Platforms and Aggregators, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 136, 146 49 (2017); Matthias Leistner &
Axel Metzger, Wie sich das Problem illegaler Musiknutzung lösen lässt, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/gema-youtube-wie-sichurheberrechts-streit-schlichten-liesse-14601949-p2.html; Hilty & Senftleben, supra note 63, at 327 28.
69 In the context of repartitioning schemes of collecting societies, the individual creator has a
relatively strong position. As to national case law explicitly stating that a remuneration right leads to an
improvement of the income situation of the individual creator (and may be preferable over an exclusive
right to prohibit use for this reason), see BGH Jul. 11, 2002, I ZR 255/00,
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=Aktuell&anz=1&pos=0&nr=13358&li
nked=pm&Blank=1. For a discussion of the individual creator s entitlement to income from the payment
of equitable remuneration, see JOÃO P. QUINTAIS, COPYRIGHT IN THE AGE OF ONLINE ACCESS
ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEMS IN EU LAW 335 36, 340 41, 347 49, 356 57 (2017); Guido
Westkamp, The Three-Step Test and Copyright Limitations in Europe: European Copyright Law
Between Approximation and National Decision Making, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y U.S. 1, 55 59 (2008);
EUR. COPYRIGHT SOC Y, OPINION ON REPROBEL (2015), https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/opinionon-reprobel/.
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within the scope of the traditional right of quotation or the traditional parody
exemption, no payment of equitable remuneration is necessary. Because of
the creative effort involved, these use privileges have a strong freedom of
expression underpinning and do not require the payment of remuneration.
Accordingly, Article 5(3)(d) of the ISD and Article 5(3)(k) of the ISD permit
the adoption of these user rights70 without providing for the payment of
remuneration.71 If, by contrast, UGC falls outside the scope of the right of
quotation and the parody exemption because of insufficient transformative
input to satisfy high quotation or parody standards, the broadening of existing
use privileges is necessary, and the payment of equitable remuneration is
advisable for the described reasons.72
C.

Pastiche Exemption as a Statutory Basis

In the absence of an open-ended fair use rule in the EU,73 however, this
plea for a new UGC privilege can only lead to practical results if an
alternative statutory basis can be found in the existing canon of permissible
use privileges in EU copyright law. EU Member States seeking to devise a
new use privilege for UGC creation and dissemination must find a concept
in the closed list of permissible copyright limitations in Article 5(3) of the
ISD and the list of filter-proof limitations in Article 17(7) of the DSMD, the
usual meaning of which can be understood to cover user-generated remixes
and mash-ups that go beyond traditional quotations and parodies. In Deckmyn
and Pelham, the CJEU established the rule that the meaning of limitation
concepts listed in Article 5(3) of the ISD had to be determined by considering
the usual meaning of those concepts in everyday language, while also taking
into account the legislative context in which they occur and the purposes of
70 Case C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62013CA0201 ¶ 26
(Sept. 3, 2014); Case C-145/10, Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533 ¶ 132.
71 Cf. TRIAILLE ET AL., supra note 11, at 465 72, 476 81.
72 Admittedly, this solution leads to the dilemma that a creative form of use is subjected to the
obligation to pay equitable remuneration. Traditionally, this has not been the case. Cf. Hilty & Senftleben,
supra note 63, 328 29. However, see the broader concept of a general use privilege for creative reuse (not
limited to UGC) developed by Geiger, supra note 67, 443 54; Christophe Geiger, Statutory Licenses as
Enabler of Creative Uses, in REMUNERATION OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS: REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF
NEW BUSINESS MODELS 305, 308 18 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2017); Christophe Geiger,
Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations, Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in
Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 541 44 (2010), who proposes a remunerated statutory
limitation for commercial creative uses, administrated by an independent regulation authority which could
solve ex post disputes between original and derivative creators on the price to be paid for the
transformative use via mediation.
73 As to lessons which the EU could learn from the U.S. in this respect, see Martin R.F. Senftleben,
Comparative Approaches to Fair Use: An Important Impulse for Reforms in EU Copyright Law, in
METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 30, 30 67 (G.B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013).
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the rules of which they are part.74 Against this background, Article 5(3)(k) of
the ISD is of particular interest. The provision allows Member States to set
limits to the right of reproduction and the right of communication to the
5(3)(k) of the ISD also permits the exemption of use for the purpose of
a purpose that is also listed in Article 17(7) of the
DSMD.
The Merriamliterary, artistic, musical, or architectural work that imitates the style of
75
76

Similarly, the Collins English
work of art that imitates the style of
77

The aspect of mixing pre-existing materials and using portions of different
works is of particular importance to the UGC debate. In many cases, the
remix of prethat mix different source materials and combine selected parts of pre-existing
works.
Existing EU copyright law, thus, already contains a concept that can
serve as a basis for the introduction of a new copyright limitation for UGC
that goes beyond the traditional right of quotation and the traditional
exemption of parody.78 Until now, EU Member States have not made
effective use of this option to regulate UGC at the national level. Instead of
clearly articulating the intention to create a UGC copyright limitation when
permit

74 Case C-201/13, Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW/Vandersteen, ¶ 19 2014 E.C.J.; Case C476/17, Pelham, ¶ 70 2019 E.C.J.
75 Pastiche,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/pastiche.
76

Id.
Pastiche,
COLLINS
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/pastiche.
78 Cf. Emily Hudson, The Pastiche Exception in Copyright Law: A Case of Mashed-Up Drafting?,
INTELL. PROP. Q., 346, 348 52, 362 64 (2017), which confirms that the elastic, flexible meaning of the
term pastiche is capable of encompassing the utilization or assemblage of pre-existing works in new
works. In the same sense, Florian Pötzlberger, Pastiche 2.0: Remixing im Lichte des Unionsrechts,
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 675, 681 (2018). See also QUINTAIS,
supra note 69, at 235, who points out that the concept of pastiche can be understood to go beyond a
mere imitation of style. In line with the results of the study tabled by TRIAILLE ET AL., supra note 11, 534
41. Quintais, nonetheless, expresses a preference for legislative reform. See QUINTAIS, supra note 69, at
237.
77
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national legislation without explaining its relevance to UGC creation and
dissemination. Article 18b of the Dutch Copyright Act, for example, exempts
the reproduction and communication to th
element of this copyright limitation in the context of UGC and providing
guidelines for its application.79 As a result, the exemption of pastiche can
hardly be expected to support amateur creators embarking on the remix of
pre-existing material. To remedy this shortcoming, EU Member States
DSM Directive. They should seize the opportunity to supplement their
national portfolio of copyright limitations with a pastiche exemption and
clarify in this context that this use privilege is intended to cover UGC.80
In national systems which already provide for the exemption of
pastiches, the courts can achieve this result as well. Accepting the pastiche
provision as a valid defense against infringement arguments in UGC cases,
they can pave the way for the recognition of the exemption of pastiches as a
copyright limitation covering user-generated remixes of protected works.
The courts also have a crucial role to play in the creation of corresponding
revenue streams. In fact, a court-made obligation to pay equitable
remuneration is not an anomaly in the European copyright tradition. In a 1999
case concerning the Technical Information Library Hanover, the German
copying and dispatching scientific articles on request by single persons and
industrial undertakings even th
activities.81 To ensure the payment of equitable remuneration, the Court
deduced a payment obligation from the three-step test in international
copyright law and permitted the continuation of the service on the condition
that equitable remuneration be paid.82
Under harmonized EU copyright law, the CJEU adopted a similar
approach. In Technische Universität Darmstadt, the Court recognized an

79 For a discussion of the objectives underlying the adoption of this copyright limitation in the
Netherlands, see Martin R.F. Senftleben, Quotations, Parody and Fair Use, in A CENTURY OF DUTCH
COPYRIGHT LAW AUTEURSWET 1912 2012 359, 365 (P.B. Hugenholtz, A.A. Quaedvlieg, D.J.G. Visser
eds., 2012). Also see the official government document explaining the implementation of the Information
Society Directive, Tweede Kamer 2001 2002, 28 482, Nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), 53. As to similar
experiences in the UK, see Hudson, supra note 78, at 351 52.
80 As to guidelines for a sufficiently flexible application of the pastiche exemption in the light of
the underlying guarantee of free expression, see Hudson, supra note 78, at 362 64.
81 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 25, 1999, case I ZR 118/96, TIB
HANNOVER, Juristenzeitung 1999, 1000 (Ger.).
82 Id. at 1005 07.
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83

of libraries to digitize books in their holdings for the
purpose of making these digital copies available via dedicated reading
terminals on the library premises. To counterbalance the creation of this
broad use privilege, the Court deemed it necessary in light of the three-step
test in Article 5(5) of the ISD to insist on the payment of equitable
remuneration. Discussing compliance of German legislation with this
requirement, the Court was satisfied that the conditions of the three-step test
were met because German libraries had to pay adequate remuneration for the
act of making works available on dedicated terminals after digitization.84
Hence, it is not unusual for courts in the EU to establish an obligation
to pay equitable remuneration with regard to use privileges that have a broad
scope. The courts derive the obligation to pay equitable remuneration from
the three-step test in international and EU copyright law.85 Considering this
practice, there can be little doubt that judges in EU Member States that
already provide for an exemption of pastiches could supplement this use
privilege with an obligation to pay equitable remuneration when it comes to
user-generated pastiches that do not reflect sufficient creative effort to fall
online platforms. This solution has the advantage of providing room for the
evolution of UGC platforms that focus on content remixes and mash-ups that
fall within the scope of the described broadened pastiche exemption or
traditional copyright limitations for the purposes of quotation or parody.
Article 17(7) of the DSMD, thus, creates a habitat for UGC that is beyond
the reach of the prevailing prohibition and licensing logic of the new EU
legislation.
D.

Reverse Filtering Logic

Admittedly, the escape route of Article 17(7) of the DSMD does not
entail a full immunity from filtering obligations. Even if a UGC platform
provider decides to focus on permitted quotations, parodies, and pastiches, it

83
84

Case C-117/13, Technische Universität Darmstadt, ¶ 48, 2014 E.C.J.

See id.
See the Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, art. 9(2), Sept. 9,
1886, S. TREATY DOC. 99 27, 828 U.N.T.S 222, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, and WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 10, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc.
105 17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 at the International Level, and European Parliament & Council of the
European Union, Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(5), 2001 O.J. (L 167), in EU copyright law. For
commentary, see Christophe Geiger, Daniel Gervais & Martin Senftleben, The Three-Step Test Revisited:
How to Use the Test s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT L L. REV. 581, 581 626
(2014); MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC COPYRIGHT LAW (Kluwer Law International 2004).
85
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will still be necessary to introduce algorithmic enforcement measures to
separate the wheat from the chaff. The platform provider will have to
distinguish between permissible pastiche and prohibited piracy. Nonetheless,
the robust use privileges for UGC in Article 17(7) of the DSMD offer
important impulses for the development of content identification systems that
seek to find creative input that renders the upload permissible instead of
focusing on third-party content that makes the upload problematic.86 The
exemption of quotations, parodies, and pastiches paves the way for a
markedly different approach to the assessment of content. Instead of focusing
on traces of protected third-party content in UGC (and starting points for
blocking content), it is decisive whether the user has added sufficient own
creativity to arrive at a permissible form of UGC.
It remains to be seen whether (and how) this reverse filtering logic can
be implemented in practice.87 It is conceivable, for instance, that users upload
not only their final pastiche but also a file containing exclusively the selfcreated material which they mingled with protected third-party content. In
case of separable input (the funny animal video on the one hand, the added
background music on the other), this allows the inclusion of the user creation
as a separate content item in the identification system. In this way, the system
88

alculating
the ratio of own content to third-party content. In addition, the potential of
artificial intelligence and self-learning algorithms must not be
underestimated. Filtering machines may be able to learn from decisions on
content permissibility taken by humans. As a result, algorithmic content
screening could become more sophisticated. It may lead to content
identification systems that are capable of deciding easy cases and flagging
difficult cases which could then be subject to human review.89

86
87

Cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 1093 96.

For critical comments on the ability of automated systems to distinguish between an infringing
copy and a permissible quotation, parody, or pastiche, see Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use
Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 41, 56 (2001); Mark A. Lemley,
Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 110 11 (2007). See
generally Yu, supra note 66.
88 As to the creation of digital reference files in content identification systems, see Lauren G.
Gallo, The (Im)possibility of Standard Technical Measures for UGC Websites, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS,
283, 296 (2011); Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 41, at 513 14.
89 Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 1096 98.
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Guidelines for Calculating Pastiche Levies

The prospect of a reverse filtering logic following from robust use
privileges for UGC offers useful reference points for calculating the right
amount of equitable remuneration for pastiches reflecting user creativity that
does not allow the invocation of the unremunerated exemption of quotations
and parodies. In practice, filtering systems seeking to identify content
elements that justify the unauthorized upload will only be attractive to
platform providers if the costs involved are lower than the costs of
implementing a conventional, prohibition-driven filtering system. After all,
providers of UGC platforms are most often commercial, profit-oriented
entities and not freedom of expression charities.
Hence, the decision on pastiche levies concerns not only the
determination of an appropriate fee but also the creation of an appropriate
incentive scheme.90 Lawmakers seeking to encourage investment in filter
technology that follows the described reverse logic identifying creative
user input that renders the upload permissible instead of focusing on thirdparty content that makes the upload problematic would have to establish
pastiche remuneration fees that are lower than regular license fees.
Otherwise, it will be cheaper for the platform industry to subscribe to the
traditional filtering model and block content whenever an upload contains
traces of protected works of third parties. Moreover, it is to be considered in
the light of freedom of expression that the creative effort invested in a usergenerated pastiche justifies a lower fee when compared with a verbatim copy
lacking any creative user input.
F.

Procedural Safeguards

A final piece of the algorithmic enforcement puzzle concerns procedural
safeguards against excessive content filtering. Until the described incentive
scheme leads to the availability of sophisticated filtering systems capable of
distinguishing between permissible pastiche and prohibited piracy, these
procedural safeguards play a central role. Article 17(9) of the DSMD
effective and expeditious
for users who are confronted with unjustified content blocking.91 Complaints
without undue delay. 92
duly
90 For a more general discussion of incentives for the development of more balanced algorithmic
enforcement tools, see Martin Husovec, The Promises of Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement: Takedown
or Staydown? Which Is Superior? And Why?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53, 76 84 (2018).
91
92

DSMD, supra note 4.
Id.
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justify the reasons for their requests 93 vis-à-vis content blocking and
removal. In the light of this substantiation of the filtering request, the UGC
platform will have to take a final decision on the status of the upload at issue.
This procedural safeguard does not show much promise for the
preservation of the quotation, parody, and pastiche habitat. As the platform
provider runs the risk of liability for infringement, a generous interpretation
of these copyright limitations serving freedom of expression seems unlikely,
even though a broad application of the right of quotation and the parody
exemption would be in line with CJEU jurisprudence.94 The elastic timeframe
without undue delay 95 differs
markedly from an obligation to let blocked content reappear promptly. As it
may take quite a while until a decision on the infringing nature of content is
taken, the complaint-and-redress mechanism may appear unattractive to
users from the outset.
A high degree of efficiency and reliability is thus crucial to the success
of the measure. Evidence from the application of the counternotice system in
the U.S.96 shows quite clearly that users are unlikely to file complaints in the
first place.97 If users must wait a relatively long time for a final result, it is
foreseeable that a complaint-and-redress system is incapable of safeguarding
freedom of expression. In the context of UGC, it is often crucial to react
quickly to current news and film, book, and music releases. If the complaintand-redress mechanism finally yields the insight that a lawful content remix
or mash-up has been blocked, the decisive moment for an affected quotation,
parody, or pastiche may already have passed.98
93

Id.
The court emphasized the need to achieve a fair balance between, in particular, the rights and
interests of authors on the one hand, and the rights of users of protected subject-matter on the other. Case
C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014 E.C.R. 62013CJ0201, ¶ 26; see also Case C-145/10, Painer v.
Standard VerlagsGmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-12533, ¶ 132.
95 DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17(9).
96 As to this feature of the notice-and-takedown system in U.S. copyright law, see Peguera, supra
note 12, at 481.
97 See the study conducted by Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or Chilling
Effects ? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006), showing, among other things, that 30% of DMCA
takedown notices were legally dubious, and that 57% of DMCA notices were filed against competitors.
While the DMCA offers the opportunity to file counter-notices and rebut unjustified takedown requests,
Urban and Quilter find that instances in which this mechanism is used are relatively rare. However,
compare the critical comments on the methodology used for the study and a potential self-selection bias
arising from the way in which the analyzed notices have been collected by Frederick W. Mostert & Martin
B. Schwimmer, Notice and Takedown for Trademarks, 101 TRADEMARK REP., 249, 259 60 (2011).
98 Apart from the time aspect, complaint systems may also be implemented in a way that
discourages widespread use. Cf. Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 41, 507 08, 514. In addition, the
question arises whether users filing complaints are exposed to copyright infringement claims in case the
94
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Against this background, it is advisable to make the submission of a
complaint against content filtering as simple as possible. If users must fill out
a complicated form and add lengthy explanations to substantiate their
request, Article 17(9) of the DSMD will remain a dead letter. To avoid this
loss of an important safeguard against excessive algorithmic enforcement,
the blocking of UGC should automatically lead to the opening of a dialogue
blocking is unj

. . my
99
.
The user should then be able to launch the complaint by simply clicking the
box with the applicable argument supporting the review request.100 Ideally,
this click should lead to the appearance of the contested content on the
platform. As copyright owners will seek to minimize the period of online
availability of allegedly infringing content, this appearance ensures that they
101

Obviously, the crux of this regulatory model lies in the question of
liability for the appearance of potentially infringing content until a final
decision is taken on the status of the content at issue. As Article 17(9) of the
DSMD also gives users access to impartial out-of-court settlement
mechanisms and, if this does not help, access to the courts, the period of
uncertainty about the status of the content may be quite long. If UGC
platforms are liable for harm flowing from content availability during this
period, they will eschew the introduction of the described regulatory model.
To solve this dilemma, platforms must not be exposed to liability for content
which, in the end, is found to infringe copyright. Therefore, a liability shield
should be available at least when the platform provider can demonstrate that
she has checked whether the user has not simply clicked one of the complaint
buttons to deceive the system and make content available which, evidently,
is mere piracy and remote from constituting a permissible quotation, parody,
or pastiche.
IV. CONCLUSION
The institutionalization of algorithmic enforcement in the DSM
Directive is worrisome. As the internet is the primary information medium in
user-generated quotation, parody or pastiche at issue (which the user believes to be legitimate) finally
proves to amount to copyright infringement. Cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 1092.
99 Cf. Quintais et al., supra note 49, at 5.
100
101

Id.
DSMD, supra note 4, at art. 17, ¶ 9.
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Western societies, it is surprising that the EU officially accepts and even
mandates the application of automated content filtering. In comparison
with voluntary decisions of private companies to introduce content
identification systems, the new EU legislation appears as the original sin of
content censorship obligations in Western democracies. Nonetheless, the
evaluation of this legal development need not be entirely negative. The
institutionalization of algorithmic enforcement offers the chance of requiring
not only the application of filtering tools but also the preservation of user
freedoms. The new EU legislation need not culminate in the blocking of each
and every item that contains traces of protected third-party content. Instead,
it can pave the way for the development of sophisticated content evaluation
systems that seek to identify quotations, parodies, and pastiches capable of
justifying the unauthorized content upload.
While there is no obligation to align voluntary, private filtering systems
with the public interest in breathing space for use privileges that support
freedom of expression and information, the institutionalization of content
filtering can make the preservation of relevant user freedoms a standard
feature of algorithmic enforcement. However, this positive side effect of the
institutionalization will only come to light if EU Member States are wise
enough to implement the DSM Directive in a way that allows the permission
logic underlying the exemption of quotations, parodies, and pastiches to
prevail over the prohibition logic of conventional filtering systems. Viewed
from this perspective, there is still hope that the new algorithmic enforcement
obligations in the EU will not disfigure copyright law beyond all recognition.

